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1. Introduction 
Getting value for money in the provision of rail services is increasingly not only of vital 
importance to public transport authorities but also to various players in the freight transport 
chain. One way of achieving this is to ensure that there is sufficient competition in the rail 
market. The degree of vertical integration at the train operation / track infrastructure interface is 
central to the discussion for introducing competition, and hence providing adequate incentives 
to produce efficiently (high quality and quantity at low cost). Once one allows for competition, 
it becomes then a question of whether competition on the tracks (open access) is desirable for 
the entire network or whether perhaps part of the network and certain services (i.e., scheduled 
passenger rail services) should be procured through tendering; that is, competition for the tracks 
(franchise contracts). Such 3rd party access is usually opposed and lobbied against by the 
incumbent operator, regardless of whether that operator is a vertically integrated train operating 
company or a franchised passenger train operator (at least in situations where the new operator 
would compete directly for traffic) that is separated from the infrastructure manager on whose 
tracks it runs train services on an exclusive basis (for a certain period of time). In both cases we 
have monopolistic structures, and open access is usually seen as a way of introducing 
innovation and incentives into the relevant market. While the entrant will bring in new 
product/services ideas, the incumbent will now be disciplined to operate more efficiently and to 
price according to market mechanisms rather than purely focussed on its internal cost/profit 
structure. While this may result in welfare improvements, it is sometimes argued that vertical 
separation, and in particular open access, will increase costs and may have detrimental side 
effects such as a lack of coordination, a loss of scale/scope economies, inferior long term 
planning/investment and particularly for freight, undesired knock-on effects on other elements 
of the supply chain. 
The European Commission approach to rail organisation (best implemented in the UK), which 
is often referred to as a model that has resulted in substantial improvements in rail performance, 
but also to cost increases in some countries (e.g. McNulty, 2011), allows besides tendered 
services, for (regulated) open access rail services in both passenger (fully liberalised by 2019)  
and freight operations. Despite its federal and decentralised rail system, in Australia there is a 
trend to harmonise rail regulation, with safety regulation being governed by a new National Rail 
Safety Regulator (NRSR) from January 2013. In terms of economic regulation, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) regulates most but not all economic and track 
access issues at the federal level, and there are voices that advocate that the open access 
approach should not only (as currently) be applied and enforced for large rail networks but also 
for privately run integrated freight railways, with a particular focus on those connecting iron ore 
mines with deep sea ports in the Pilbara (Western Australia).  
The aim of this paper is to establish whether open access is, in the view of rail managers, 
appropriate for all train operations in Australia in terms of transaction cost economics. For that 
we undertook a survey of senior Australian rail managers in rail companies asking them for 
their views and experiences with the transactions that they have with infrastructure managers, 
regulators and other train operating companies. The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 
and 3 provide an introduction to the theoretical context of open access and an overview of the 
Australian rail market respectively. The methodology and sample are presented in section 4, 
followed by a discussion of the main results in section 5. Section 6 summarises our findings and 
offers some policy recommendations. 
2. Theoretical background and setting the scene 
The European approach to improving cost efficiency and to reduce the need for subsidies for 
railways is to introduce effective competition. The current European legislation (consolidated in 
its core in Directive 2012/34/EU), which will be strengthened by the fourth railway package in 
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2014 (it has not taken any effect yet, the legislative process is advanced but not finished), 
requires that all railways (except for local or regional stand-alone networks) have to be 
vertically separated, at least to the extent of having separate accounts and divisions for 
infrastructure, passenger and freight operations (but can be part of the same holding company). 
According to European law (EC COM(2010) 475) member states may exclude certain 
undertakings from the application of most of its rules related to infrastructure access, which 
includes, most relevantly to this paper, “undertakings which only operate freight services on 
privately owned railway infrastructure that exists solely for use by the infrastructure owner for 
its own freight operations". 
In cases where the management of the infrastructure is not independent of train operators, the 
directives require that key decisions on the allocation of capacity, and the setting of track access 
charges, must be taken by a third party. In principle there are a number of mechanisms available 
to facilitate competition in rail markets. One is to split the rail network horizontally and let a 
number of vertically integrated rail companies (i.e., train operation and infrastructure 
management under one roof) compete with one another. The second option is to separate 
infrastructure management from the train operations so that multiple train operators compete for 
track access capacity on a level playing field. The third option is to allow vertical integration, 
but to mandate that the vertically integrated rail company allows third parties (other train 
operators) to use its tracks (with that access being governed by track access agreements and slot 
contracts). This is usually referred to as open access, at least in the rail freight business. On the 
passenger side, open access also refers to circumstances where there is competition in the 
market (between different train operators sharing the same track infrastructure) as opposed to 
the franchise model where train operators compete for the market (through tendering). Open 
access is practiced in all freight rail markets in Europe (which is legally opened up for freight 
and for international passenger trains). To some extent it is also permitted in passenger rail 
markets, with the pioneers being Sweden, Germany and the UK, but recently also starting in 
other parts of Europe (such as high speed train operator NTV competing with Trenitalia in Italy 
or open access competition in the Czech Republic). In practice open access in the European 
passenger rail market can be classified into two approaches. The German and Swedish approach 
is that any operator can apply for infrastructure access and a neutral institution coordinates these 
applications and resolves conflicting applications based on objective criteria (full open access 
used as the precondition for free competition in the market). In contrast, in the UK open access 
in the passenger context is used for free competition for the capacities which remain after the 
franchising of passenger rail services (second-tier open access to spare capacities). In practice 
this means that if a potential operator identifies a new market for train services not currently 
served by a franchise, they can apply to Network Rail (the UK rail infrastructure manager) for 
open access rights to run those trains. 
While it is widely acknowledged that complete separation of infrastructure and operations has 
the benefit of removing a prime motive for discrimination by the infrastructure manager, there is 
concern that it may raise costs. Econometric evidence from studies of the European experience 
(e.g., Friebel et al., 2010; Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009; Cantos et al., 2010) does not yield 
consistent results. Hence, the most efficient degree of vertical separation of European rail 
systems is subject of an ongoing debate (e.g. Bougna and Crozet, 2013). Interestingly, for 
purposes of this paper, Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) found that cost savings of a vertically 
integrated organisation depends on train density, with lower train density tending to reduce and 
higher train density to increase cost, which led van de Velde et al. (2012) to conclude that EU-
wide imposition of vertical separation in rail would increase costs. This may be similar in the 
Australian context, and we conjecture whether mandatory open access, which essentially is a 
degree of vertical separation, is indeed cost efficient for all types of train operation and on all 
parts of the network. 
Further to the cost discussion, there is the concern that contractual relationships between 
separated train operations and infrastructure management would result in higher transaction 
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costs than in an integrated or a holding model (Preston, 2002; Pittman, 2005; Growitsch and 
Wetzel, 2009. Merkert’s (2012) empirical results suggest that vertical separation indeed 
increases transaction costs1, but in a later study Merkert et al. (2012) reveal that even in the 
most extreme case of full vertical separation and open access, transaction costs at the train 
operation / infrastructure interface only account for three per cent of total operating cost. 
However, what they have also shown is that the transaction cost difference between more 
integrated and separated railways is largest for open access passenger operators followed by 
open access freight train operators (those not operating on their own tracks). This indicates that 
open access is a transaction cost critical issue, also confirmed by Merkert and Nash’s (2013) 
qualitative findings that suggest that open access passenger train operators in Germany (who 
operate non-franchised passenger operations on track infrastructure that is to some extent 
integrated with the incumbent train operator Deutsche Bahn through a holding company model) 
perceive their environment much more uncertain and complex than their Swedish and UK 
counterparts (who run non-franchised passenger trains on the vertically separated national track 
network). This is also a result of weak regulation of the conditions of track access. Access rights 
are awarded only 9 months before the start of the operations, which makes it despite the fact that 
full open access is granted almost impossible to take the risk of investment into new rolling 
stock (at least at a larger scale). 
In terms of the theoretical justification for open access, it is usually argued that according to the 
theory of contestable markets (Baumol et al., 1982), not only market entry as such but also the 
threat of entry alone, would be sufficient to incentivise the market players to produce efficiently 
and to offer their product/services at market/cost prices, rather than enjoying monopolistic 
producer rents. This view, however, is rather limiting in that its interpretation focuses on costs 
and assumes a steady state without innovation and dynamics within the relevant market 
(Carlton, 2004).  
For the European passenger rail markets, it has been found that open access competition (in the 
sense of offering passenger services not subject to franchising, such as First Hull Trains running 
services on the East coast mainline in the UK) has been limited (although now starting in a 
number of European countries) and that there is evidence that undesirable cream skimming can 
be problematic in terms of achieving the aim of increased welfare (Nash, 2010). For passenger 
operations, Allen and Lu (2010) point out further that in order to make open access work, it 
should be consolidated and governed region wide by some public transport authority in order to 
increase the purchasing power for train paths and to achieve a productive relationship with the 
infrastructure manager. In terms of freight, Zunder et al. (2013) established that open access 
enabled significant growth of cross border pan European rail freight operations despite the fact 
that those open access operators faced very challenging barriers from various players including 
incumbents, infrastructure managers, terminal operators and even rail regulators (e.g., with 
regards to non-transparent energy supply; monopolistic shunting services; safety certification; 
terminal access restricting trade; weak regulatory authorities or the access to non-path 
infrastructure and services). This is expected to be similar in the Australian interstate market. 
Further difficulties in the EU cross-border market are related to different safety rules, a lack of 
clarity in the state’s track infrastructure managers (or incumbents) track access conditions as 
well as differences in signalling systems, voltage and gauge (which often requires multiple 
changes of locomotives along the journey; (see e.g., The Economist, 2013), which again is also 
likely to be an issue in interstate (and even intrastate) rail transport in Australia. While Drew 
(2009) shows that, for the European case, freight customers would benefit more from vertical 
separation than just open access, it is very unlikely that vertical separation (and possibly also 
open access) will be the optimal option for all rail operations in Australia. To investigate the 
applicability of the various European views in the Australian context, in this paper we will to 
                                                          
 
1 In line with Coase (1960), we define transaction costs in this paper as all costs resulting from preparing, 
negotiating, enforcing and monitoring contracts and rights. 
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compare the different types of train operations in Australia through the lens of transaction cost 
economics. 
According to Williamson’s (1998, 2005) theoretical transaction cost framework, a rail company 
would in terms of its choice of governance structure primarily aim to minimise its transaction 
cost. The level of transaction cost is driven by (at least for transactions associated with problems 
of small-number exchange relationships) a lack of partnerships, asset specificity, complexity of 
environments, frequency of exchange, and perceived uncertainty of the firms in question. 
Highly specific assets, such as railways (see e.g., Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 2005 or Preston, 
2002), can result in investment hold-up (i.e., if the contract is due for renewal, the stronger 
partner may try to dispossess the quasi rent of the weaker partner) or lock-in issues where the 
partner who did not make the investment in the specific asset may extract the resulting potential 
quasi-rent (Klein et al., 1978). For that reason, some firms tend to internalise stages of the 
production process, depending primarily on Williamson’s key transaction attributes: asset 
specificity, frequency and uncertainty. Asset specificity in particular is seen as problematic in 
the traditional transaction cost economics literature, and applies to both the question of the 
optimal degree of vertical integration and open access in railways. The latter can be seen as a 
degree of vertical separation (i.e., in the freight market), where an integrated rail company gives 
third parties access to its infrastructure and hence employs contracts (between the 3rd party and 
the infrastructure arm of the integrated firm) rather than internal hierarchies (train operating arm 
and infrastructure arm of the same integrated firm) for parts of its train path portfolio. In the rail 
context, competition and hence open access is further seen as increasing transaction costs as a 
result of an increased need for train service co-ordination (Starkie, 1993). From a transaction 
cost perspective a la Williamson, large or highly specialised railways with only one operator 
and one infrastructure manager with specific technical characteristics (e.g., signalling and 
electricity systems) would have therefore strong incentives to vertically integrate with no option 
for open access (as their transactions are specific, frequent and often uncertain). As shown in 
Merkert and Nash (2013), this theoretical case is not applicable to most European train 
operators, and it is questionable whether all train operations in Australia are associated with the 
same transaction attributes and readiness for open access. 
3. The railway market in Australia 
Railways play a vital role for both passenger and freight operations in most parts of Australia. 
As shown in Figure 1, there are substantive passenger operations in five of Australia’s seven 
states (but not in the Northern Territory and Tasmania), and freight rail haulage is significant in 
all states, most notably in Western Australia (iron ore), Queensland (coal, sugar, grain) and New 
South Wales (coal). According to the Australasian Railway Association (ARA, see Nye, 2013), 
770m passenger journeys were made and 951m tonnes of freight carried in 2012 by rail, with 
both passenger and freight networks at or exceeding their capacity. There are over 1,800 
locomotives and 32,000 wagons and carriages in the system, and in 2012 alone the industry saw 
$36bn of investment commitments in rolling stock and track. The Australian rail industry 
employs 44,210 people directly (+70,000 working in industries supporting rail). 
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Fig. 1. The Australian railway market in a nutshell 
Source: Gavan (2013) based on: Australian Transport Safety Bureau: Australian Rail Safety Occurrence 
Data. 
Passenger rail operations are primarily an intra-state business with very limited inter-state 
operations (mainly for tourism purposes). Contrary, rail freight also affects inter-state operations 
but the trip length depends on the commodity that is carried. It is noteworthy that in contrast to 
Europe, a major focus in Australia is on transporting mining products. In 2012, around 931m 
tonnes of bulk commodities (coal, ore, sugar, bauxite, grain etc.) and 13.99m tonnes of non-bulk 
commodities were moved by rail freight. In 2012, 818m tonnes of that were dedicated to coal 
and iron ore transport. The Royal Bank of Scotland Transport Equities’ (2012; Nye, 2013) 
estimates suggest that by 2020 this will be some 1530m tonnes, which, at current levels of 
investments in rail infrastructure, clearly shows a key capacity challenge but also the 
opportunity for rail freight in Australia (note that “only” 43.5m tonnes of goods are moved by 
rail to and from the UK’s ports). However, this will only affect parts of the network which 
currently has a total length of 44,262 km of track.  
While, as illustrated in Figure 2, there is a long distance interstate standard gauge network, 
considerable gauge differences still exist across the country, which indicates increased asset 
specificity. The majority of the interstate network is managed by the Australian Rail Track 
Corporation (ARTC; federal government owned corporation established in 1998 and vertically 
separated from any train operation). According to ARTC, the consistency of regulatory and 
commercial arrangements across Australia has increased in the last decade as a result of 
allowing larger parts of the interstate network to be managed by a single infrastructure manager 
(ARTC) through leasing parts of the interstate network in Victoria (1998), NSW (2004) and 
Queensland (2011). This has increased the number of cooperative arrangements between 
jurisdictions at an operational level (ARTC, 2013). 
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Fig. 2. The Australian rail network 
Source: Australasian Railway Association. 
Most rail track infrastructure managers in Australia (regardless of whether they are separated 
from train operations of vertically integrated train operators) are, as a result of being seen as 
natural monopolies with potential for abuse of market power, regulated at the federal level by 
the ACCC. In the light of additional jurisdiction/state specific rail legislation, in 2006 all state 
governments agreed through the Competition and Infrastructure Reform Agreement (CIRA) to 
provide for less complex and more consistent economic regulation of significant infrastructure, 
including railways. Through that process a proposal for a track access code was developed 
which would have governed coverage and intensity of regulation applicable to all rail networks 
(including a consistent set of principles for track access). This proposal was considered by all 
governments, but according to ARTC (2013) the relevant governments decided to proceed 
differently by seeking certification of existing state based regimes in order to satisfy CIRA 
requirements.  
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Table 1. Below-rail (track) service providers in Australia (outside metropolitan areas) 
Infrastructure 
manager  
Integrated or 
separated Location Primary usage 
Interstate 
ARTC 
 
separated 
 
Brisbane–Kalgoorlie, via Melbourne 
and Broken Hill [excluding track 
around Sydney–Newcastle] 
intermodal, grain, ores, 
steel 
 
Brookfield Rail  separated  Kalgoorlie–Perth  intermodal, grain 
Genesee & 
Wyoming Austr.  integrated Tarcoola–Darwin  intermodal, ores 
Intrastate 
Aurizon (QR 
National) 
integrated  
 
Goonyella, Newlands, Moura,  
Blackwater coal lines 
coal 
 
Queensland Rail  
 
integrated 
(mostly) 
Non-coal lines in Queensland 
 (but including West Moreton coal)  
passenger, grain, coal, 
cattle, ores, intermodal 
John Holland  separated  
NSW grain lines and Cobar line 
(Country Regional Network)    grain, ores, cotton 
RailCorp (NSW 
Trains) 
int.. (pax);  
sep. (freight)  
Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong 
   
metropolitan areas 
passenger 
ARTC  separated  
Hunter Valley, Parkes–Dubbo,  
Boggabilla, Yarrawonga–Oaklands  coal, grain, cotton 
Portland, Benalla–Yarrawonga   grain, mineral sands 
V/Line 
  
int. (pax); 
sep. (freight) 
Intrastate Victoria 
 
passenger, grains, mineral 
sands, intermodal 
TasRail  integrated  Tasmania intermodal, coal, ores 
Asciano (for 
Alinta Energy) integrated  Stirling North – Leigh Creek  coal 
Brookfield Rail  separated  Intrastate tracks in south-west WA   grain, ores 
BHP Billiton  integrated  Pilbara (to Port Hedland)  iron ore 
Rio Tinto integrated  Pilbara (to Dampier, Cape Lambert)   iron ore 
Fortescue Metals 
Group integrated Pilbara (to Port Hedland)  iron ore 
Aurizon in talks 
(2015?) 
integrated but 
applying for 
open access  
Pilbara (to Port Hedland) 
 iron ore 
Note: In addition to these key players, there are a number of smaller infrastructure managers, which we 
don’t cover in this paper (some 578 route-km in total). Source: BITRE and ARA (2012). 
Although interstate rail access is in most cases not an issue (because of ARTC and Brookfield 
Rail being vertically separated and Genesee & Wyoming Australia regulated), at the intrastate 
level it is still an aspect that introduces a degree of uncertainty for all parties involved. It creates 
uncertainty among potential new entrants (and their investors) as well as vertically integrated 
rail operators who currently do not have open access operators running services on their tracks 
but are concerned about voices demanding open access for all types of train operation in 
Australia. As shown in Table 1, at the intrastate level there are a variety of infrastructure 
managers, some being vertically separated while others are integrated.  
While open access is mandatory on interstate routes, at the intrastate level there are minor but 
important differences. Access to intrastate integrated rail infrastructure is generally mandatory 
in Queensland (QR), Tasmania (TasRail), Victoria (to a small extend Pacific National 
(otherwise separated train operator) and V/Line) and South Australia (Genesee & Wyoming 
Australia) under National Competition Policy principles agreed by the Federal, State and 
Territory governments in these states. While the train operators in those states act as incumbents 
on their own track infrastructure, they all (with the exception of TasRail) also operate trains in 
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other jurisdictions and are hence affected by open access both ways. The most interesting 
railways are the iron ore railways of the Pilbara and the sugar cain railways in Queensland, who 
are vertically integrated at the train operation / track infrastructure interface and are also 
backwards integrated into their respective (upstream) supply chains (e.g., iron ore mines). With 
that regard, Will-Johnsson (2007) found that any policy recommendation on open access 
(mandatory third party access to rail infrastructure) and economic regulation should depend not 
only on the specifics of the rail freight tasks under consideration but also on the characteristics 
of the related logistics chains, as summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2. Recommendation for regulation of different rail freight markets in Australia 
Commodity/ 
market 
 Recommendation for 
regulation/open access 
 Main justification 
Iron ore  No open access  Potential reduction in efficiency of supply chain as 
rail infrastructure manager is also backwards 
integrated into mining operations, and 3rd party 
access would reduce flexibility in optimisation of 
train ops and mining shifts 
Coal  Open access  No backward integration into mines 
Bauxite and 
alumina  
 Open access but not in all 
cases 
 Three out of four refineries owned by same firm and 
hence cross-subsidisation if rail operator supporting 
industry gets too powerful 
Grain  Open access in principle but 
not mandatory 
 Competition from road freight industry who offer 
rates that ensure that rail can hardly recover costs 
Steel  Best case for open access   Only one railway company running trains for the 
three steel producers in Australia (in three states); 
monopoly rents; open access would result in welfare 
improvement and benefit the steel industry 
Intermodal  
freight 
 Open access only on East-
west links 
 Everywhere else trucking is likely to offer rates that 
ensure that rail can hardly recover costs 
Source: based on Wills-Johnson (2007). 
Will-Johnsson (2007) undertook a desk top analysis only; our paper however seeks to discuss 
the perspectives of the involved rail managers. We also provide an update to the open access 
situation. While open access in freight train operation has been an issue for some time (for 
example, in 2005 Linfox and Queensland Rail challenged Pacific National over access), and 
although most freight tasks are to some extent still affected by uncertainty over open access, in 
recent years it was particularly the non-regulated Pilbara iron ore railways who have caught the 
attention of the media, investors and the mining business at large. Initially it was Fortescue 
Metals Group who was the underdog fighting to get access to BHP Billiton’s and Rio Tinto’s 
infrastructure, but since 2013 the roles have changed as Fortescue denies rail access to 
Brockman Mining. While backward integration is also discussed in the coal business (see for 
example the proposed alliance between GVK and QCoal on a rail/port link from coal mines in 
the Bowen Basin to Abbot Point in Queensland) it has so far only happened in the Pilbara, 
where the three big iron ore players - BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Fortescue Metals Group - run 
integrated train operations exclusively for their iron ore arms. Will-Johnson (2007) argues that 
these railways are very efficient as a result of the same company owning the mines, as well as 
controlling all other parts of the integrated logistics components, namely the railway (train 
operation and track infrastructure), the port and the product. The single decision maker has full 
knowledge of the system, and it is argued that open access to the rail track infrastructure for 3rd 
parties would create inefficiencies, complexities and delays in addressing operational and 
investment issues. These are all aspects that are commonly discussed in the transaction cost 
context too.  
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The situation became even more interesting in April 2013 when junior miners Atlas Iron and 
Brockman Mining, as well as Aurizon Operations Ltd. (Australia’s largest freight train 
operator), published the first phase of their independent Pilbara rail study which aimed at 
evaluating the scope for a new, multi-party, open access railway (in the sense of Aurizon 
running the trains for any interested mining company, rather than a single/dedicated miner) 
connecting iron ore mines the East Pilbara to Port Hedland. It is worth noting that their study 
was based on the economics of this new independent rail solution from the mining companies’ 
point of view in the sense of that alternative to the status quo aggregating rail freight throughput 
from a number of operating and prospective minors. This model of open access would be a mini 
step towards the European model in the sense that one vertically separated train operator would 
most likely become a monopoly player on the relevant rail lines.  Although, since then, Aurizon 
indicated that it would not be rushed into such a project (reportedly the cost for the rail network 
would be some $10bn), the project idea still shows that open access is high on the agenda in 
Australian railways. In May 2013, the situation intensified when junior miner Brockman Mining 
considered submitting an open access proposal to a Pilbara rail system (which would then 
become much more similar to the European model) and by doing so to test for the first time the 
Western Australia access code. In this case Brockman was seeking access rights for 20 years to 
Fortescue Metal track infrastructure that would allow it to use another party (Aurizon) to haul 
20m tonnes of iron ore from its Marillana project to Port Hedland. In August 2013, Western 
Australia’s Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) approved the start of negotiations between 
TPI, Fortescue Metal Group’s infrastructure subsidiary, and Brockman over the requested 
access to its Pilbara railway tracks. However, in October 2013 Fortescue challenged ERA’s cost 
determination and decision to support negotiations between it and Brockman Mining, for rail 
access in the WA Supreme Court. While third party access is now certainly on the nationwide 
agenda in Australia, the debate on open access does seem to be limited to freight (contrary to 
Europe), with two different forms of open access. One where miners and train operators try to 
get access to an existing vertically integrated iron ore line of one miner (the European open 
access debate) and one where a group of miners and a train operator want to work together to 
ensure that all minor get access to rail infrastructure (open access for a preferred train operator 
who is not owned by a mining company). While the earlier could potentially be linked to 
intended competition effects at the train operating level, the latter would rather allow to make 
accessible and exploit different mining areas more efficiently (and hence have competition 
effects at the mining company level). 
4. Methodology  
The aim of this paper is to establish whether open access is, in the view of rail managers, 
appropriate for all train operations in Australia. In addition to desk top analysis, we have 
undertaken a survey of senior rail managers in passenger and freight train operating companies 
as well as key infrastructure managers in Australia. We asked them for their views and 
experiences with the transactions that they have with infrastructure managers, regulators and 
other train operating companies. By doing so we focused on vertical integration and open access 
in the context of the three key transaction attributes of Williamson’s framework, namely asset 
specificity (How easy (time and cost) would it be for your company to move its a) rolling stock, 
b) human assets such as train drivers, c) brand and d) all other assets to other parts of the 
network), frequency (How many trains does your company run and how often do you/your 
company interact with the infrastructure manager per week?) and uncertainty. Regarding the 
latter, we differentiated uncertainty into trust between the infrastructure manager and the train 
operating companies (How much do you trust your infrastructure manager? How certain are you 
that he does not act against your companies interest?), and the exogenous environment which 
includes uncertainty over future regulation (How uncertain are you regarding future regulatory 
changes, level of subsidies or other exogenous factors that might affect your business?). We 
further explored open access issues potentially related to disputes, behavioural aspects or 
Open access for railways and transaction cost economics – Management perspectives of 
Australia's rail companies  
Merkert and Hensher 
 
10 
regulatory actions, with a specific focus on the role of various institutions, contracts, trust and 
regulation. For the sake of simplicity, we focused on open access as being mandatory third party 
access to otherwise vertically integrated infrastructure, and have omitted the further potential 
differentiation in the passenger train operation context of non-franchised versus franchised 
passenger train operations. 
With regard to the sample, we approached all train operating companies and the larger track 
infrastructure managers in Australia (as well as two train operators in New Zealand). While we 
were in contact with more than 80 managers, a total of 45 senior rail managers participated but 
not all completed all questions of the survey. This is a result of us asking some background 
questions (e.g. their position within the firm) and hence ensuring that all respondents were 
working in a position that qualified them to provide robust/well informed answers. As shown in 
Table 3, we obtained a full/valid response from 15 rail companies, including four passenger 
train operators (TOCs; please note that this includes KiwiRail who are based in New Zealand 
and who also run some freight operations), nine freight train operators, and two separated 
infrastructure managers (SIM). Seven of the 13 train operating companies are vertically 
integrated on either their entire network or on parts of their network and hence also manage 
below rail infrastructure. The nine freight train operators can be further classified into six 
general freight train operators (FOCs) and three iron ore freight train operators (IronFOCs), the 
latter being vertically integrated (also with the mines) and with no connection to any other 
network. 
Table 3. Sample of analysed rail companies 
 Primary  
business 
 Governance at  
train/track interface 
Queensland Rail (pax arm of old QR)  TOC  Integrated 
V/Line  TOC  Integrated (some separated freight) 
Great Southern Rail   TOC  separated with long term contract 
KiwiRail  TOC/FOC (NZ)  Integrated 
Aurizon  FOC  separated with long term contract 
Pacific National Rail  FOC  separated with long term contract 
Qube Logistics  (South Spur Rail S.)  FOC  separated with long term contract 
Manildra Group  FOC  separated with long term contract 
Watco Companies Western Australia  FOC  separated with long term contract 
Genesee & Wyoming Australia   FOC  Integrated 
BHP Rail  IronFOC  Integrated 
Rio Tinto Iron Ore Rail  IronFOC  Integrated 
Fortescue Metals Group  IronFOC  Integrated 
Brookfield Rail  SIM  separated with long term contract 
ARTC  SIM  separated with long term contract 
 
While initially we feared that the IronFOCs would not cooperate, all of them eventually did. In 
terms of the management level of the respondents, our data shows that all of them are in senior 
management with a number of them being at the CEO/MD level. It is worth noting that 
metropolitan train operators did not provide us with useful responses. While some of them never 
replied, others stated that is not in their board’s interest to contribute to our study, which we find 
an interesting and unexpected result in itself. As all of these metropolitan train operators are 
vertically integrated with no option of open access (and apart from Melbourne in public 
ownership and hence with no internationally experienced parent group supporting them), we 
decided to discuss them separately in the results section. 
Open access for railways and transaction cost economics – Management perspectives of 
Australia's rail companies  
Merkert and Hensher 
 
11 
While we acknowledge that the sample consists of very different types of train operations, we 
see this as a positive in that if a trend can be established across all types or within a certain type 
of rail business, then that will inform policy makers about the specifics of either all or parts of 
Australia’s diversified rail system. Although the sample is representative (geographically, type 
of operation, seniority of management) we did not envisage testing our findings for statistical 
significance, but rather we use mean and standard deviation values to show any potentially 
existing trends in the collected data. 
5. Results 
The survey results show that there are systematic differences in perceived transaction attributes 
across the different types of train operations in Australia. In terms of similarities, as with 
Merkert and Nash (2013), we argue that temporal asset specificity is by definition relatively 
high in any type of railway operation. The findings suggest that in contrast to the European case, 
the frequency of interactions between Australian train operators and track infrastructure 
managers across the different types of train operations is relatively low, which would favour 
vertical separation and open access. In terms of differences, it becomes apparent that perceived 
asset specificity, uncertainty and trust levels differ noticeably across the different types of train 
operation as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Perceived transaction and relationship attributes by type of operation 
  TOCs* FOCs IronFOCs SIM Total 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean 
Rolling stock asset  
specificity** 1.0 0 2.0 1.1 3.7 1.5 1.0 0 1.7 
Human capital asset  
specificity** 1.2 0.5 2.0 0.9 2.0 0 1.5 0.7 1.7 
Brand asset 
specificity** 1.7 0.9 1.8 0.8 3.3 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.9 
Other asset specificity** 2.0 0.8 3.7 0.5 3.0 1 3.5 2.1 3.1 
Trust between train  
operator and IM (1-10) 7.3 1.9 5.3 2.7 10 0 9.0 1.4 7.3 
Exogenous  
uncertainty (1-10) 7.0 2.2 6.2 1.2 3.7 3.8 7.0 2.8 6.0 
Level of disputes 
between train operators 
and IM (1-10) 6.0 2.7 4.7 3.4 1.7 1.2 2.0 0 4.1 
Most important in  
relationship to IM*** 2.8 0.5 2.7 0.5 3.0 0 2.5 0.7 2.7 
Note: * TOCs= passenger train operating companies; FOCs= freight train operating companies; 
IronFOCs= Iron ore freight train operating companies; SIM= separate infrastructure managers 
** the values for asset specificity were: 4= impossible; 3= Matter of 1-2 years; 2=Matter of a few                                 
months; 1=Matter of a few days (very low asset specificity) 
*** the values for Most important in relationship to IM were: 1=tough/independent/transparent   
regulation; 2=good contracts; 3=trust and good relationships 
What is apparent in the results presented in Table 4 is that the  perceived transaction attributes 
of all of the IronFOCs are almost identical and very much in line with the textbook small 
relationship transaction cost economics case. Their asset specificity (regardless of which type) is 
highest in relation to all other types of rail operation, their trust towards the infrastructure 
manager is extremely high (with no variation across the three IronFOCs), which is underpinned 
with very low level of disputes and the high importance they place on trust and good 
relationship to the infrastructure manager (again with zero variation). From a cost benefit 
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perspective, the competition effects of potential open access (as a degree of vertical separation) 
to existing rail infrastructure (in the sense of both other train operators getting onto the 
IronFOCs’ vertically integrated rail infrastructure and other miners getting access to the 
vertically integrated rail solution of the relevant IronFOC; this is however unrelated to the 
earlier discussion on building a new line with open access for miner and one train operator 
having monopoly access rights) in such a setting would have to be significant in order to over 
compensate the expected increase in transaction costs.  
As expected, the TOCs perceive their transactions with the infrastructure manager differently, 
and the FOCs (who are associated with some variation across them as a result of some of them 
being vertically integrated while others are not) are approximately in the middle between the 
TOCs and IronFOCs. That said, both FOCs and SIM place slightly more importance on good 
contracts than trust, which indicates past bad experiences with the other side. In terms of asset 
specificity, it is noteworthy that is not so much the rolling stock or the human capital but rather 
other assets (such as depots and terminals) that are, across all types of rail operation, perceived 
to be associated with relatively high levels of asset specificity. We also note that the freight 
share on Australian rail lines is in many cases either much higher or much lower compared to 
most of Europe, suggesting a mix of operations and hence increased complexity in Europe. 
Turning our focus again to the metropolitan rail operations, Nye (2013) stresses the importance 
of the intra-region market by highlighting the 770m passenger journeys p.a. (2012) in those 
areas and the 5 % annual growth of this market segment, which translates into 60,000 new 
passenger journeys every week and 300 new passenger cars every year. It is hence valuable to 
discuss the characteristics of metropolitan passenger train operations, despite their management 
refusal to contribute to our study. Table 5 shows that the metropolitan railways in Australia are 
similar in the sense of their governance (vertical integrated monopoly with no open access) and 
ownership structure (apart from Melbourne all in public ownership). However, the differences 
are also quite apparent, most notably in the different network sizes/mixes, gauges and electrical 
systems.  
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Table 5. Key network characteristics of urban railways in Australia 
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
Integrated/separated  integrated integrated  integrated  Integrated  integrated 
Primary usage  Pax  Pax  Pax  Pax  pax 
Ownership Public private  Public Public public 
Route lengths 
Dedicated metropolitan  
pax. route length (km) 
181 
 
234 
 
86 
 
168 
 
88 
 
Dedicated metropolitan 
cargo route length (km) 
33 
 
66 
 
81 
 
121 
 
62 
 
Shared metropolitan 
passenger/freight 
route length (km) 
156 
 
196 
 
134 
 
1 
 
30 
 
Non-metropolitan 
passenger  
route length (km)  
714 
 
0 
 
172 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Electrical system 
(overhead, for 
passenger trains) 
1 500 kV 
DC 
1 500 kV 
DC 
25 kV 
50 Hz 
25 kV  
50 Hz 
Not 
electrified 
Gauges 
Urban passenger lines 
(mm)  1435 1600 1067 1067 1600 
Interstate** freight 
lines (mm) 1435 1435 1435 1435 1435 
Intrastate freight lines 
(mm) 1435 1600 1067 1067 1600 
Operators (pax) 
 
Sydney 
Trains /  
NSW trains 
Metro 
Trains*** 
Queensland 
Rail  
Transperth 
  
Adelaide 
Metro 
Number of vehicles 1 618 987 627 234 100 
Note: * government franchise; ** Some intrastate freight operate on interstate tracks in Sydney, 
Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide; *** Some metropolitan services are provided by V/Line, the State 
government country service operator. Source: based on BITRE (2012); BITRE and ARE (2012). 
Given that each system has its very own specific characteristics, it is possible (even without 
receiving the responses of the relevant managers) to conclude that the transactions associated 
with train operation and infrastructure management are aligned with very high asset specificity, 
high frequency and possibly (based on the European experience of similar operators as detailed 
in Merkert and Nash, 2013) high uncertainty. This suggests that vertical integration or 
competition for the train operating market (franchising with long term contracts) would be 
appropriate governance structures for this type of operation, although it is less clear why open 
access (in the sense of competition in the market) should not be feasible in this context. If an 
open access (rather than franchising the entire metropolitan network) policy would be pursued, 
the key issue would be to assure that all passenger open access operations in the relevant 
metropolitan area would be consolidated and governed region wide by some public transport 
authority. 
In terms of the results of our survey, we received answers on three further sets of questions. 
Table 6 shows the managers’ reply on the following question: 
“Thinking about the degree of vertical integration and open access, how important are the 
following issues for your choice of organisational structure?” 
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Table 6. Importance of issues for your choice of organisational structure 
TOCs FOCs IronFOCs SIM  Total 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD  mean 
Protection of your train operating  
company's investment 9.75 0.50 9.33 1.21 10.00 0.00 9.00 1.41 
 
9.5 
Speed and quality of decision 
 making processes 7.75 1.71 8.50 1.05 9.33 1.15 8.50 0.71 
 
8.5 
Duplication of processes and staff  
cost at both sides of the interface 5.75 2.36 6.67 2.07 8.67 1.15 3.50 0.71 
 
6.4 
Certainty of your company about  
the current and future situation 7.25 1.71 8.67 0.82 9.00 1.00 8.50 0.71 
 
8.3 
Control of your company over access  
& management track network 7.00 1.63 8.33 1.86 10.00 0.00 8.50 0.71 
 
8.3 
Leverage of risks across different  
stages of the value chain 7.50 1.73 8.33 1.03 8.67 2.31 7.50 0.71 
 
8.1 
Cost and ease of coordination 7.50 1.29 8.67 1.03 8.00 2.00 9.50 0.71  8.3 
Level of competition between  
train operators 5.50 2.38 6.50 1.76 6.67 3.06 4.00 0.00 
 
5.9 
Incentives to efficient production  
at both train operation and  
infrastructure level 9.00 0.00 8.00 1.10 8.33 2.08 7.00 1.41 
 
8.2 
Independent and efficient regulation  
of the rail infrastructure manager 7.25 1.71 8.83 1.33 6.67 3.06 6.50 0.71 
 
7.7 
Note: A value of 10 stands for very high importance.  
Our results suggest that IronFOCs place relatively high importance on all issues except 
regulation. Only SIM place less importance on regulation of the rail infrastructure manager 
which is hardly a surprise as any firm would not perceive its own regulation as important. With 
regard to the most important issue for railway choice of organisational structure (mean of all 
firms), protection of the rail firms’ investment scores highest, followed by speed/quality and 
cost of decision and coordination processes. IronFOCs place the highest possible value (without 
any variation across the three IronFOCs) on the protection of investment and control of access 
and management of track networks, underlining the point that open access would most likely 
not be their choice of organisational structure.  
This is further manifested by the results on the next set of questions (which is related to the 
previous set), as summarised in Table 7. The question we asked the rail managers was:  
“Thinking about the degree of vertical integration and open access, how has your experience 
with this issue been to date?” 
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Table 7. Experience with issues for your choice of organisational structure 
TOCs FOCs IronFOCs SIM mean 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Protection of your train 
operating company's 
investment 6.3 1.7 6.8 3.2 9.7 0.6 7.5 0.7 7.3 
Speed and quality of decision 
making processes 4.5 1.3 6.2 3.4 9.0 1.7 7.5 2.1 6.5 
Duplication of processes and 
staff cost at both sides of the 
interface 5.5 1.0 6.0 2.1 9.0 1.7 7.5 2.1 6.7 
Certainty of your company 
about the current and future 
situation 4.3 1.7 7.3 3.3 9.0 1.7 6.0 0 6.7 
Control of your company 
over access & management 
track network 4.3 1.9 6.5 3.1 9.7 0.6 7.5 2.1 6.7 
Leverage of risks across 
different stages of the value 
chain 5.8 1.5 6.7 1.9 9.0 1.7 7.0 1.4 6.9 
Cost and ease of coordination 4.8 2.2 5.7 3.1 9.0 1.7 7.5 0.7 6.3 
Level of competition 
between train operators 5.0 2.2 5.8 2.5 9.3 1.2 7.0 1.4 6.5 
Incentives to efficient 
production at both train 
operation and infra. Level 3.5 0.6 5.0 3.5 9.7 0.6 7.0 1.4 5.8 
Independent and efficient 
regulation of the rail 
infrastructure manager 4.0 2.7 6.2 2.6 7.3 3.8 6.0 0 5.8 
Note: A value of 10 represents very satisfied and 1 stands for very dissatisfied with the relevant issue. 
The results in Table 7 suggest that IronFOCs are most satisfied with their current operating 
environment (and all the issues that are usually associated with vertical integration), as they 
score on average highest (by quite a margin) in all of the prompted areas. In addition to 
transaction cost arguments, this can also be related to economies of scale and the 
simplicity/homogeneity of their commodity. What they run and try to protect from any 
disturbance (which would in their view be a result of third party access to their track 
infrastructure) is a fully optimised and standardised integrated supply chain, which takes their 
case beyond the usual train operation/track infrastructure interface discussion (for the latter see 
e.g., Merkert and Nash, 2013). TOCs on the other hand tend to be most dissatisfied regardless of 
the organisation issue in question, with least satisfaction about incentives to efficient production 
at both train operation and infrastructure level, presumably targeting the latter participant. 
Finally we asked our respondents the following question: 
“How important are the following institutions to the relationship between train operation, 
infrastructure management and open access?” 
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Table 8. Importance of institutions to the relationship between train operation, infrastructure 
management and open access 
TOCs FOCs IronFOCs SIM mean 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Regulator 7.0 3.5 9.2 1.0 6.7 3.1 8.0 0.0 7.9 
Public Transport 
Authorities (or 
Ministries of Transport) 6.8 2.4 8.0 1.9 3.7 1.2 2.5 0.7 6.1 
Your company's end 
customers 8.3 2.4 9.3 0.8 9.3 1.2 9.0 1.4 9.0 
Your parent company 7.0 1.4 9.3 0.8 9.0 1.7 5.5 6.4 8.1 
External consultants 3.3 2.1 5.7 1.2 3.0 2.0 2.5 0.7 4.1 
Competitors of your 
company 5.8 2.9 8.3 1.4 2.3 1.2 6.0 2.8 6.1 
Note: A value of 10 stands for very high importance.  
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that the rail firm’s end customers are most important to 
the relationship between train operation, infrastructure management and open access. Reviewing 
Tables 5 to 7, this was expected for the IronFOCs (as their customers are their backward 
integrated mines) but not for the FOCs who place the same level of importance on end 
customers. Interestingly FOCs see, apart from external consultants, all of the listed institutions 
as very important for vertical rail organisation and open access. In addition to their parent 
company (noting that it is likely that FOCs are the type of rail operation that is most likely to 
have a parent company),they place very much importance on the regulator but also on public 
transport authorities and ministries. What we find most noteworthy is that FOCs are similarly 
concerned about and focused on supply chain efficiency and their end customers than backward 
integrated IronFOCs. SIM and surprisingly also IronFOCs place very little importance on their 
competitors when it comes to the relationship in question. This confirms that for IronFOCs, the 
competition does not happen at the train operating level but between integrated mine supply 
chains. In those well optimized supply chains any open access is perceived as a significant 
disturbance. That said, we note that Newcastle is a useful example for cooperative competition 
in access to the port, with of course the key difference being that it is not associated with 
backward integrated iron ore mines. 
6. Conclusions 
The organisation of railways, and particularly the aspect of mandated open access to vertically 
integrated rail infrastructure, is currently a heated topic in Australia. This paper sets out to 
analyse for the Australian context rail managers’ perception of transaction attributes (asset 
specificity, frequency, uncertainty, the latter further distinguished into trust and exogenous 
uncertainty) and organisation issues with regards to the relationship between train operators, 
infrastructure managers and open access. While we have established some similarities with 
respect to the relatively low frequency of transactions required in Australian railways (compared 
to the European case), our results suggest some significant differences across the different types 
of train operation in Australia.  
Interestingly, while in Europe the open access debate is focused on open access passenger 
operators trying to get access to routes of either vertically integrated or separated franchised 
(incumbent) passenger train operators, in Australia the recent debate has been centred around 
end costumers (i.e., miners) and 3rd party freight train operators trying to get access to vertically 
integrated freight track infrastructure. Our results suggest that perceived asset specificity is an 
issue particularly for the vertically, privately owned IronFOCs who are essentially an integrated 
business along the entire supply chain from the mine to the deep sea ports. Our survey has 
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further shown that according to the managers’ perceived transaction attributes and organisation 
issues at the train operation / track infrastructure interface, IronFOCs are least suitable for open 
access from a transaction cost perspective. While this confirms Will-Johnson’s (2007) 
theoretical considerations, we do not say that open access (particularly second-tier open access 
to spare capacities) cannot be implemented for this type of train operation (and the Pilbara more 
generally). Rather, we conclude that all other types of train operation (including the 
metropolitan passenger railways) in Australia are, from a transaction cost perspective, on 
average much more suitable as candidates for open access. Hence the European example of 
excluding privately owned and vertically integrated freight train operators from the relevant 
directives may be worth considering in the Australian policy making context of mandatory third 
party access to existing privately owned rail infrastructure. If the intended competition effects 
are to be initiated at the mining company rather than train operating level (in a sense of allowing 
access to bottleneck infrastructure to explore or exploit mining areas more efficiently), then the 
policy question (and with it potential conclusion on open access) becomes different to the 
European case of trying to improve the efficiency of its railways and in general a policy 
question that goes beyond the organisation of railway firms. What our research has also 
established is the importance of ensuring a clear definition and terminology when using the term 
open (third party) access. As discussed, full open access, second-tier open access to spare 
capacities or an essential facilities approach providing access under specific conditions have not 
only different intentions but also substantially different effects. 
The survey has also revealed that trust between the infrastructure manager and the train 
operating companies, in contrast to good contracts or independent regulation, is what makes the 
railways work. This confirms and strengthens Merkert and Hensher’s (2013) findings on the 
importance of trust in the organisation of transportation, insofar as trust and good working 
relationships can reduce transaction costs regardless of the degree of vertical separation. What is 
interesting in the Australian rail context is that the level of trust between train operation and 
infrastructure management appears to be higher in vertically integrated iron ore rail companies 
(IronFOCs), which suggest that those systems benefit from more stable operation and lower 
transaction costs. Further research should investigate the potential benefits of full and second-
tier open access to IronFOCs infrastructure, and evaluate whether they outweigh the increase in 
transaction costs. 
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